Trump’s year in the Pacific

As the first year of President Donald Trump’s second term draws to a close, analysts are assessing Washington’s posture in the Asia-Pacific region—who the biggest winners and losers are and what the shifting balance means for the United States’ competition with China.

U.S. Presence and China’s Rise

The Asia-Pacific, home to about half of the world’s population and roughly 60 percent of global economic output, remains the center of global trade and power competition. One-third of world commerce passes through its sea lanes. For decades, the United States enjoyed near-total military dominance across the region, backed by a network of bases from Japan and South Korea to Guam and the Philippines. That presence ensured freedom of navigation and deterred escalation, maintaining stability even among rivals with overlapping claims.

China’s rapid rise has changed that. Over the past decade, Beijing has expanded and modernized its military, now possessing the world’s largest navy by ship count. It has invested heavily in hypersonic and anti-ship missiles designed to push U.S. forces farther from its coast and fortified artificial islands across the South China Sea. The result is a growing power imbalance with neighboring Taiwan, which Chinese leaders say they can seize by force if political efforts toward unification fail.

Newsweek reached out to the White House, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Japan’s Cabinet Office and the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs by email with requests for comment.

Policy Shifts Under Trump’s Second Term

Trump’s return to the White House in January brought expectations of renewed confrontation with Beijing. Yet analysts say his policies have had uneven results—sometimes reinforcing China’s influence even as Washington maintains its military reach.

“I think China has probably seen an improvement in its position, particularly with how tariffs have played out,” Rob York, director of the Pacific Forum think tank in Honolulu, told Newsweek. “Some of those tariffs fell especially hard on countries that are up for grabs in terms of alignment. On top of that, disputes—especially with India—have really soured those relations.”

“Overall, this administration seems more focused on the benefits of trade and tariff policy. Coupled with aid cuts and other reductions in soft power, that’s worked to China’s benefit—at least for now.”

China’s assertive behavior in the region has continued. Chinese coast guard ships have repeatedly rammed or water-cannoned Philippine vessels in the U.S. ally’s exclusive economic zone, while its fighter jets have intercepted U.S. and Australian patrol aircraft. Yet Washington’s public focus has shifted toward trade and away from security.

“Taiwan is one of what Beijing says are its core interests,” York said, “and this administration appears to be emphasizing [economic interests] above all. We’re not seeing the same kind of emphasis on Taiwan’s security.”

That perception deepened when Trump reportedly refused to allow Taiwan President Lai Ching-te a U.S. transit stop during his visit to Latin America, a move widely viewed as an attempt to ease trade talks with Beijing amid economic uncertainty.

Strategic Engagement With Beijing

Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing, said he is “cautiously optimistic,” pointing to what he described as a record number of high-level meetings planned for 2026.

“One thing he did do was disallow Lai’s visit,” Wang told Newsweek. “He has to get along with China.”

Wang compared Trump’s approach to comments by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in July.

“We’re two big, powerful countries, and there are always going to be issues that we disagree on,” Rubio told reporters. “I think there’s some areas of potential cooperation and I thought it was a very constructive, positive meeting, and a lot of work to do.”

He said Trump’s second term “could be stabler than the Biden era,” noting that tensions had spiked after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, which prompted a fierce reaction from Beijing.

Wang also pointed to the administration’s newly released National Security Strategy, which again identifies China as the United States’ “primary strategic competitor.” He said the document stresses the importance of keeping channels of communication open and managing competition in a stable way.

According to Wang, Washington has recently shifted some of its focus toward the Western Hemisphere, and he expressed hope that the coming year would bring a “more stable, more balanced” phase in U.S.-China relations. He said the relationship is likely to experience periodic friction but could enter what he called a “new normal,” while regional organizations such as ASEAN could see greater prosperity.

In Taiwan, Wang noted, parties favoring engagement with Beijing now hold a parliamentary majority. He noted that Beijing currently has far more military power than it would ever need to use, arguing that, despite U.S. arms sales to Taipei, the overall trend remains toward peaceful dialogue.

Both countries are seeking a new balance of strategic stability and mutual respect, he said, adding that China has not extended its military reach toward Hawaii or Florida, unlike the way U.S. vessels operate in the South China Sea.

U.S. Alliances and Regional Competition

The U.S. remains the dominant military force in the Pacific, maintaining roughly 375,000 personnel under Indo-Pacific Command. Japan has pledged to double defense spending by 2027, the Philippines has opened four additional bases for U.S. access, and Australia hosts rotational bomber deployments under the AUKUS agreement. Washington has also maintained the Quad partnership with Japan, India and Australia and continues to conduct freedom-of-navigation patrols through contested waters.

Yet there remains some friction between the Trump administration some traditional U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, where some officials remain wary of Trump’s transactional approach to diplomatic relations.

At the same time, Beijing has expanded its regional influence through trade. China’s commerce with ASEAN now exceeds its trade with the U.S., and Belt and Road projects, though slower than before the pandemic, still give it economic leverage across Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

“China has thrown away goodwill before through its more aggressive behavior,” York said. “But over the past year, I’d say things have gone quite well for them.”

Korean Peninsula and Future Outlook

The Korean Peninsula has again drawn attention after North Korea resumed missile launches and border skirmishes. Wang called for a new four-party framework including China, the U.S. and both Koreas to pursue “peaceful reunification,” arguing that cooperation there could stabilize the broader region.

The 2025 National Security Strategy outlines Trump’s vision of “strategic stability through strength,” pledging to deter China while keeping “guard rails” to avoid conflict. It reaffirms U.S. alliance commitments but defines engagement in reciprocal, transactional terms rather than open-ended security guarantees.

For now, Washington and Beijing appear to be testing the boundaries of what Wang described as a “new normal.” The coming year will determine whether that balance can hold amid Taiwan’s 2026 elections and renewed economic friction.

“Both sides seek to establish a new equilibrium,” Wang said.